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TRANSPORTATION OF STATE PRISONERS TO THEIR
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 18711 authorizes United States
citizens whose constitutional rights have been violated by persons acting
under color of state law to bring suit2 in federal court.3 State prisoners
often bring suits under the Act.4 Although they do not have a right to be
1. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
2. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), (4) (1982) grants federal district courts original jurisdic-
tion of actions brought under the Civil Rights Act.
4. Between 1972 and 1979, the number of actions brought by state prisoners under
§ 1983 increased from 3348 to 11,195. Federal Judicial Center, Prisoner Civil Rights
Committee, Recommended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in the
Federal Courts 2 n.9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Aldisert Report]. The number continues
to rise. Id at 8; see California Dep't of Corrections v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1425, 1426
(1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Gast v. Daily, 577 F. Supp.
14, 15 (E.D. Wis. 1984). In some districts, the number of filings is very high. In 1979,
for example, 923 such actions were filed in the Eastern District of Virginia, 705 in the
Middle District of Florida, 511 in the District of Maryland, and 431 in the Southern
District of Texas. Aldisert Report, supra, at 8 n.14. For a more detailed analysis of the
number of § 1983 suits, see Turner, When Prisoners Sue! A Stidy of Prisoner Section
1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 613-16, 658-63 (1979).
The number of filings has burdened the judicial system. The courts have had difficulty
in managing the sheer numbers. See, e.g., Gast v. Daily, 577 F. Supp. 14, 15 (E.D. Wis.
1984); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316-17 (D. Or. 1983), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); Green v.
Camper, 477 F. Supp. 758, 759-69 (W.D. Mo. 1979). One judge has stated that he has
spent as much as 47% of his working time on prisoner cases. See Aldisert Report, supra,
at 8 n.14. Another problem is that most of the complaints are filed pro se, id. at 2-3, and
are consequently difficult to understand, id at 11-12. Moreover, pro se pleadings must be
given special consideration by the courts. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(per curiam). The fact that the cases are brought pro se also means that few will be
settled, because "meaningful negotiations between prisoners acting pro se and states' at-
torneys are practically impossible." Turner, supra, at 637; see Aldisert Report, supra, at
13-14 & n.26 (use of counsel would limit frivolous cases). In addition, there is no re-
straint on unwarranted litigation because the plaintiff, usually proceeding in forma
pauperis, is undaunted by the expense of the suit. See Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp.
595, 597-98 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (because of their poverty, prisoners are immune from later
tort actions for malicious prosecution) (quoting Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)). Furthermore, preparing for
cases provides the plaintiff with "relief from the tedium of prison life." Aldisert Report,
supra, at 3 (footnote omitted); see Note, Limitation of State Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits in
the Federal Courts, 27 Cath. U.L. Rev. 115, 116 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights
Suits]. Thus, many cases brought by prisoners under the Civil Rights Act are frivolous.
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See Aldisert Report, supra, at 9-10; Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on
the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 586-87 (1972). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(1982) permits any United States court to "authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit. . . without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a
person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor."
Prisoners have been quick to take advantage of this provision. See, e.g., In re Green, 669
F.2d 779, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prisoner able to file hundreds of complaints in forma
pauperis); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th Cir. 1979) (court should permit
filing under § 1915(a), then proceed to next step of determining whether complaint is
"frivolous or malicious" within meaning of § 1915(d) which provides that the court may
dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis suits); Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944, 947
(S.D. Tex. 1977) (prisoner able to carry on "lengthy private wars and vendettas. . . at
no monetary expense to himself"). But see Braden v. Estelle, 428 F. Supp. 595, 598-601
(S.D. Tex. 1977) (adopting plan whereby prisoner would make a partial payment of fees).
The statute makes no special provisions for the attendance of witnesses, however. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982) ("[w]itnesses shall attend as in other cases"). In other cases
involving indigent parties, the government may pay witness' fees on behalf of the indigent
party. See Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 772 n.7 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1118 (1979); cf United States v. McGaha, 205 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
(criminal case). Prisoner-witnesses have no equivalent entitlement to payment of witness
fees. See Meadows v. United States Marshal, 434 F.2d 1007, 1008 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1971); Marchese v. United States, 453 F.2d 1268,
1270-71 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
Courts may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis suits. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
Although Congress has not defined frivolity, courts have held that a complaint is frivo-
lous if it is without arguable merit. See Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir.
1983) (per curiam); see, eg., McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir.) (forced
shaving not violative of civil rights), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 499 (1983); Franklin v. Ore-
gon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1325, 1326 (D. Or. 1983) (complaints that prisoner was not
awakened from his afternoon nap and that prison guards wore "clopping heels" held to
be frivolous), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy,
745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984).
Courts have acted to protect themselves from being overwhelmed by the morass of
frivolous prisoner suits. See, eg., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court
threatened to hold petitioner in contempt if he continued to file frivolous complaints);
Gast v. Daily, 577 F. Supp. 14, 15 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (court will not allow prisoner to file
second in forma pauperis action without court's permission); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F.
Supp. 1310, 1334 (D. Or. 1983) (court will only accept six in forma pauperis suits from
same prisoner within each twelve-month period), affid in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Civil
Rights Suits, supra, at 122-30 (examining other means of reducing the burden on the
courts). Compare Aldisert Report, supra, at 54-58 (recommending ways of handling in
forma pauperis complaints) with Turner, supra note 3, at 646-47 (arguing against in-
creased requirements for proceeding in forma pauperis). Because so many prisoner ac-
tions are frivolous "it is difficult to ensure that the meritorious complaint is found and
given careful attention." Aldisert Report, supra, at 11; see Federal Judicial Center, Re-
port of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 587 (1972).
A significant number of prisoners' civil rights claims are meritorious. See Aldisert
Report, supra, at 11; see, eg., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (suit for law
library); Bienvenu v. Beauregard Parish Police Jury, 705 F.2d 1457, 1460 (5th Cir. 1983)
(allegations of cold, rainy and roach-infested conditions sufficiently stated a cause of ac-
tion); Madyun v. Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 873 (7th Cir. 1981) (intentional taking of
plaintiff's property constituted a cause of action).
The burden on the courts, however, may be exaggerated for several reasons. Many
cases are dismissed quickly, court appearances and trials are rare, and the litigation is not
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present at their civil trials,' justice may require a prisoner's presence in
complex. See Turner, supra, at 637. But see Aldisert Report, supra, at 3, 11-12 (because
the cases are pro se, it is often difficult to understand even the nature of the complaint).
The number of prisoner § 1983 actions has also caused problems for correctional of-
ficers who are frequent defendants. See, e.g., McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 144 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 499 (1983); McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1203
(W.D. Ark. 1984); Allen v. Coughlin, 527 F. Supp. 1096, 1096 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). In a
successful suit, the prisoner may be entitled to a money judgment from his keepers. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act,
intended to provide a remedy), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also C. Bartollas, Introduction to Correc-
tions 224-25 (1981); V. Fox, Introduction to Corrections 411-14 (2d ed. 1977). In order
to protect themselves from liability, many correctional administrators have placed their
property in their spouses' names. See V. Fox, supra, at 412-13.
The prisoner cases also impose a burden on the states. The state may have to expend
funds to correct what the federal judiciary has found to be unconstitutional prison condi-
tions. See, eg., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (requiring prison authorities
to provide inmates with law libraries); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1375-76 (5th
Cir.) (en banc) (upholding injunction against overcrowding), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950
(1981); see also Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal courts
have power and duty to intervene to prevent constitutional deprivations). See infra note
51. The state may also suffer monetary losses if it has agreed to indemnify its employees.
See C. Bartollas, supra, at 273.
The most pervasive effect on the prison system, however, is not dependent on whether
the suit is successful. Although not long ago prisons operated without written rules,
"today prison authorities are engulfed in bureaucratic paper. There are regulations,
guidelines, policy statements, and general orders; there are forms, files and reports for
virtually everything." Turner, supra, at 639. This bureaucratization is the result of a
perceived need for accountability to the courts, id, and a real need for protection from
prisoner suits, see V. Fox, supra, at 411-15. In addition, litigation is a time consuming
process, especially when one warden may be served with several suits. See C. Bartollas,
supra, at 273.
5. See Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1980); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d
730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976); Moeck v. Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177, 180 (7th Cir. 1976); Clark
v. Hendrix, 397 F. Supp. 966, 968-69 (N.D. Ga. 1975). Prisoners do, however, have a
right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Andrade v.
Hauck, 452 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1971); see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972);
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). Access to the courts must be "adequate, effec-
tive, and meaningful." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977); see Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 579-80 (1974) (inmates may assist each other in pursuing civil rights
claims); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (inmates may assist each other in
habeas corpus actions); Spears v. Chandler, 672 F.2d 834, 835 (1lth Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (access not adequate when "prisoner's pro se § 1983 action is dismissed for lack
of prosecution" when court has refused to order prisoner's presence); Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1981) (right of access not limited to preparation
and presentation of complaints). Nonetheless, the right of access is not unlimited. See
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974) (state need not provide counsel for indigent in
discretionary appeal); Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir.) (right of access
does not require court to pay party's witness fees), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 282 (1983); cf
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights"). Prisoners do not
have "an absolute and unrestricted right to file any civil action they might desire. Other-
wise, penitentiary wardens and the courts might be swamped with an endless number of
unnecessary and even spurious law suits." Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956). "In cases challenging the validity of con-
finement in which there are material factual disputes as to events in which the prisoner
participated, the Supreme Court has all but mandated the presence of the prisoner." Ball
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the courtroom either to act as a witness6 or to prosecute his claim pro
se.
7
The writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is the traditional proce-
dural means of securing a prisoner's presence to testify.8 The writ, by
v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 807 (N.D. Ala. 1975), modified mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th
Cir. 1976); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1952); Walker v. John-
ston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941). See supra note 4.
Prisoners may bring suits other than under the Civil Rights Act, see Corpus v. Estelle,
551 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1977) (access to courts includes general civil matters), but
because of the nature of confinement, most prisoner actions are brought under § 1983, see
Turner, supra note 4, at 610 ("Prison life creates the potential for an enormous number of
cases under section 1983."). This Note, therefore, discusses only prisoner cases brought
pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Wig-
gins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1425 (1984); Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1178 (3d Cir. 1982); Spears v. Chandler,
672 F.2d 834, 835 (1lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam); ITEL Capital Corp. v. Dennis Mining
Supply & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1981); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404,
406 (7th Cir. 1978); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Stone v.
Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1976).
Courts may also summon prisoners to testify on another's behalf. See, e.g., Garland v.
Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1284 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion), cert. granted sub nom.
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166
(1985); Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255-56 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Marks v.
Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 26 (N.D. W. Va. 1978); cf United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d
379, 380 (6th Cir. 1972) (court has broad discretion to order presence of prisoners as
witnesses in criminal cases), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Hath-
cock, 441 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1971) (court should have mandated presence of pris-
oner, even though defense counsel in criminal case did not state that he would definitely
use prisoner as witness).
7. See, eg., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Jerry
v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 253 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); cf Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266, 284 (1948) (court may order presence of prisoner to argue his habeas corpus
appeal).
8. The writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum permits a court, at its discretion, to
order the in-court production of a prisoner. See United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Cur-
rency, 722 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1984); Spears v. Chandler, 672 F.2d 834, 835 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Stone v. Morris, 546
F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1976); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649, 655-56 (5th
Cir. 1974); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 80 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affid in part and
rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 808 (N.D.
Ala. 1975), modified mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976); Clark v. Hendrix, 397 F. Supp.
966, 969 (N.D. Ga. 1975); cf United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir. 1972)
(criminal case), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Hathcock, 441 F.2d
197, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).
The power to issue the writ is explicitly granted to the federal courts by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c) (1982), which states: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless-. . . . (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial." Id.
The writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was one of the early common law writs
used "by the courts at Westminster, for removing prisoners from one court into another
for the more easy administration of justice." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129; see
id. at *130. The writ of habeas corpus ad testiticandum should be distinguished from
"the great and efficacious writ" of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, issued to inquire into
the legality of the prisoner's confinement. Id. at *131; see Carbo v. United States, 364
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statute, must be directed toward the custodian of the detainee.9 The per-
son to whom the writ is directed "shall be required to produce at the
hearing the body of the person detained."10 There is no equivalent statu-
U.S. 611, 614-15 (1961); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 78 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 81-82 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2254 (1982)) authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus.
The Act stated that the writ could be issued to prisoners if it were necessary for them "to
be brought into court to testify." IdL; see Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 614 (1961)
(quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 81-82 (1789)); Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 99 (1807); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 479-80 (5th Cir.
1977).
Courts have differed as to whether they may issue the writ ad testificandum to require
the transportation of prisoners incarcerated outside their territorial jurisdiction. The
habeas corpus statute provides that the writ may be granted by courts only "within their
respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1982). The majority view, therefore, had
been that courts could not issue such writs extraterritorially. See Edgerly v. Kennelly,
215 F.2d 420, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1954), overruled, Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 737 (7th
Cir. 1976); Clark v. Hendrix, 397 F. Supp. 966, 974 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Silver v. Dunbar,
264 F. Supp. 177, 179 (S.D. Cal. 1967). The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
territorial limitation set out in the statute applies only to the "Great Writ," see Carbo v.
United States, 364 U.S. 611, 619 (1961), and that the writ may be issued as long as the
custodian can be reached by service of process, see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,
410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973). Thus, the emerging majority view, relying on these two cases,
is that the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum may be issued extraterritorially. See
ITEL Capital Corp. v. Dennis Mining Supply & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 406-07 (5th
Ciar. 1981); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1976), overruling Edgerly v.
Kennelly, 215 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1954); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 79 (C.D.
Cal. 1981), affld in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985); Ball v. Woods,
402 F. Supp. 803, 807 (N.D. Ala. 1975), modified mer., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976).
9. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973); Wales v.
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885); Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir.
1984) (plurality opinion), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v.
United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. CL 1166 (1985); Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176,
1179 (3d Cir. 1982); McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (V.D. Ark. 1984).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982). At common law, the person to whom the writ was
directed could "return no satisfactory excuse for not bringing up the body of the pris-
oner." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *132. Congress has followed the common law.
See 28 U.S.C § 2243 (1982); see also Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1286 (3d Cir.
1984) (plurality opinion) (noting "obligation of state custodians to respond to witness
process."), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985); McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1205
(W.D. Ark. 1984) (obligation to produce prisoners must be borne by custodian); United
States ex reL Griffin v. McMann, 310 F. Supp. 72, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ("duty to produce
the prisoner lies upon the Warden and the State"); cf. Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176,
1181 (3d Cir. 1982) ("state custodians will be in compliance with writs of habeas corpus
ad testificandum. . . if they transport the prisoners to the county jail nearest the federal
courthouse").
If the custodian fails to respond, he may face contempt charges. Cf Fx parte Young,
50 F. 526, 526-27 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1892) (custodian of child held in contempt for failure
to produce child in court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus); United States v. William-
son, 28 F. Cas. 682, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,725) (custodian of slave held in con-
tempt for failure to produce slave in court pursuant to writ of habeas corpus). Moreover,
the custodian, as an officer of the state, must obey the mandates of the federal judiciary
pursuant to the supremacy clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932); cf United
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tory authorization for a writ of habeas corpus ordering a state custodian
to produce a prisoner to prosecute his claim pro se." Under these cir-
cumstances, the court may, pursuant to the All Writs Act,' 2 issue a writ
of mandamus directing the custodian to produce the prisoner in court.' 3
The decision to order the transfer of a prisoner is within the discretion
of the trial court. 4 The court may consider the state's interests in main-
taining confinement 5 and minimizing disruption of prison routine,16 as
well as the costs of transferring an indigent prisoner to court.' 7 This cost
States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) ("If the legislatures of the several
states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States,. . . the con-
stitution itself becomes a solemn mockery; and the nation is deprived of the means of
enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals."); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
11. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 281-84 (1948).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982) provides that "[tihe Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
Like the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, the All Writs Act (Act) traces its roots
to § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 81-82 (1789) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2254 (1982)). See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506
(1954); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948). Courts have used the All Writs Act
to secure the presence of prisoners. See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
220-21 (1952) (court may use Act to order production of prisoner at proceeding to set
aside his sentence); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 278-79 (1948) (Act empowers courts
to order that prisoners be brought before them to argue their own appeals). Appellate
courts generally use the Act to supervise actions of lower courts. See Berger, The Manda-
mus Power of the United States Courts of Appeals: A Complex and Confused Means of
Appellate Control, 31 Buffalo L. Rev. 37, 37-39 (1982); Ward, Can the Federal Courts
Keep Order in Their Own House? Appellate Supervision Through Mandamus and Orders
of Judicial Councils, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 233, 238-47.
13. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 278-79 (1948).
14. See supra note 8.
15. Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Stone v. Mor-
ris, 546 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1976); Moeck v. Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177, 180 (7th Cir.
1976).
16. See Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d
526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affid
in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985); Seybold v. Milwaukee County
Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484, 488 (E.D. Wis. 1967); cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979) (correctional officials should be given deference in adoption of policies "needed to
preserve internal order"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976) ("federal courts
do not sit to supervise state prisons"); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per
curiarn) (same); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.) (only in extreme cases
will court interfere with discipline by prison officials), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
17. See United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir.
1984) (quoting Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977)); ITEL Capital
Corp. v. Dennis Mining Supply & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1981) (same);
Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting Stone v. Mor-
ris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976)); Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980);
Moeck v. Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177, 180 (7th Cir. 1976); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F.
Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1981), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.
1985); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 809 (N.D. Ala. 1975), modified mem., 541 F.2d
279 (5th Cir. 1976); Silver v. Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
This focus on costs is unfortunate because if the court is protecting constitutional
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factor has caused discontent among state custodians, who claim that they
rights, it should not consider the costs of transporting the prisoner. See Ballard v.
Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977). A court should not determine that the
prisoner's testimony would actually assist it in its fact-finding capacity, and then "be
deterred from obtaining the prisoner because the state is unable to pay the full costs of
witness production and because the similarly strapped Marshals Service is itself hard
pressed to shoulder any such burden." Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir.
1984) (Becker, J., concurring), cert granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction
v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
Although some district courts have refused to issue the writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-
candum and have then dismissed the complaint when the prisoner failed to appear to
prosecute his claim, this result has consistently been held to be erroneous because it con-
stitutes a denial of "[a]dequate access to the courts." Spears v. Chandler, 672 F.2d 834,
835 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1980)
(court "clearly abused its discretion when it dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to pros-
ecute"); Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) ("dismissal of the
action could not properly be based on the fact that the plaintiff failed to come to court").
See supra note 5.
In exercising their discretion, courts may also consider risk of danger to the public,
whether the prisoner's presence will substantially aid the resolution of the suit, see United
States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Ballard
v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476,480-81 (5th Cir. 1977)); ITEL Capital Corp. v. Dennis Mining
Supply & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Jerry v. Francisco, 632
F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); Moeck v. Zajackowski,
541 F.2d 177, 180 (7th Cir. 1976); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985); Ball v. Woods, 402 F.
Supp. 803, 809 (N.D. Ala. 1975), modified mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976); Silver v.
Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1967), and whether the suit can be stayed until
the prisoner's release, see United States v. $64,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 722 F.2d 239, 246
(5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977)); ITEL
Capital Corp. v. Dennis Mining Supply & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1981)
(same); Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting Stone
v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)); Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th
Cir. 1980) (same); Moeck v. Zajackowski, 541 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1976); Seybold v.
Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Wis. 1967). But see Wimberly v.
Rogers, 557 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1977) (mdefinite stay of proceedings is "tantamount
to a denial of due process"); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(same), affid in part and rev'd in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985). Courts may also
consider the substantiality of the matter at issue, see Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255
(3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir.
1976)); Holt v. Pitts 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Maurer v. Pitchess, 530 F.
Supp. 77, 80 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (same), aff'd in part and revid in part, 755 F.2d 936 (9th
Cir. 1985), the need for an early determination of the matter, see Jerry v. Francisco, 632
F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36
(7th Cir. 1976)); Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); Maurer v. Pitch-
ess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 80 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (same), aff'd in part and rey'd in part, 755 F.2d
936 (9th Cir. 1985); cf Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) (court
should consider interest of defendant in not having case left pending against him), and the
probability of success on the merits, see Holt v. Pitts, 619 F.2d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976)). But see Jerry v. Fran-
cisco, 632 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (courts should not consider merits in
deciding whether to order transfer); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir.
1977) (courts should not consider merits because that looks to the "ultimate result of the
action rather than the need for the prisoner's testimony").
The Supreme Court in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), noted some considera-
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are unable alone to bear the costs of transportation.' 8 In an attempt to
reduce this burden, many custodians have petitioned federal courts to
order the United States Marshals Service to assist in producing in-
mates. 19 Several courts, relying on various statutory authorities, have
tions for determining whether to order the production of a prisoner to argue a case
personally:
If it is apparent that the request of the prisoner to argue personally reflects
something more than a mere desire to be freed temporarily from the confines of
the prison, that he is capable of conducting an intelligent and responsible argu-
ment, and that his presence in the courtroom may be secured without undue
inconvenience or danger, the court would be justified in issuing the writ. But if
any of those factors were found to be negative, the court might well decline to
order the prisoner to be produced.
Id. at 284-85 (footnote omitted).
Thus, before exercising its discretion, the court should be certain that the issues raised
are substantive and that a courtroom appearance would be clearly useful to a determina-
tion of the facts.
The court may also consider other less costly and less dangerous alternatives, including
use of depositions. See Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978); Ball v.
Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 811 (N.D. Ala. 1975), modified mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1976); Silver v. Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D. Cal. 1967). This option may be
unsatisfactory when issues of credibility are to be determined, see Heidelberg v. Hammer,
577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978), presumably because the finder of fact will be unable to
observe the witness' demeanor. The parties may also agree to hold the trial without jury
at the prison. See Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978). Alterna-
tively, the court may delay the trial until the prisoner's release. See id. This is a sensible
alternative when the prisoner will be released within a reasonable time. When the plain-
tiff will be imprisoned for many more years or is seeking injunctive relief, however, this
option is not viable. See id. Moreover, an indefinite stay of proceedings may constitute a
denial of due process. See Wimberly v. Rogers, 557 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1977); Mau-
rer v. Pitchess, 530 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affid in part and rev'd in part, 755
F.2d 936 (1985). The statute of limitations may also pose a problem for the prisoner-
plaintiff. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), does not provide a statute of
limitations; therefore, "[t]he applicable period of limitations is that which the state itself
would enforce had an action seeking similar relief been brought in a court of that state."
Beard v. Stephens, 372 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1967); see Seybold v. Milwaukee County
Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Wis. 1967) (where state law did not toll statute of
limitations for prisoner's entire period of imprisonment, court granted requests to file
actions to save prisoner's loss of rights); Silver v. Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.
Cal. 1967) (tolling applicable statute of limitations until prisoner released from prison).
In order to avoid the need for the prisoner's presence when the prisoner seeks only to
argue his case pro se, the court may appoint counsel for him, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1982); Aldisert Report, supra note 4, at 12-13, or the prisoner may be able to secure
counsel on a contingency fee basis, see Silver v. Dunbar, 264 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D. Cal.
1967). Given the low success rate of prisoner civil rights actions, see Ball v. Woods, 402
F. Supp. 803, 810 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (historically, few actions have succeeded), modified
mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Aldisert Report, supra note 4, at 9-10 (in
1979, 96.5% of § 1983 actions were dismissed or otherwise concluded before trial), this
may be an unrealistic option.
18. See, e.g., Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opin-
ion), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985); Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.
1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984); Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d
1176, 1178 (3d Cir. 1982); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 405 (7th Cir. 1978); McGee v.
Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1203 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
19. See supra note 18.
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rendered such orders.2" These orders, which are in the nature of a man-
damus,2 1 have been strongly opposed by the Marshals Service. 2
This Note examines the purported bases for the issuance of such or-
ders and demonstrates that federal courts are not authorized to compel
the Marshals Service to bear any costs for the production of state prison-
ers in federal court. Although this imposes an undue burden on the
states, congressional action would be required to correct the imbalance.
I. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF
STATE PRISONERS
The United States Constitution states that "[n]o money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law."23 Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, possess only
that power granted to them by either the Constitution or an act of Con-
gress.24 Federal courts, therefore, may not order the United States Mar-
shals Service to use federal funds to transport state prisoners without
some express statutory authority.25
20. See, e.g., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (rely-
ing on 28 U.S.C. §§ 567(2), 569(a), (b) (1982)); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 407-08
(7th Cir. 1978) (relying on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982))); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977)
(relying on 28 U.S.C. §§ 567, 569(a), (b) (1976) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 567,
569(a), (b) (1982)) and on 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.1 1(b), i), 0.138a, 0.142 (1976) (current ver-
sionat28 C.F.R. §§ 0.111(b), (i),0.138, 0.142 (1984))). See infra notes 26-70 and accom-
panying text.
The circuits have disagreed not only on the statutory bases, but also on how the burden
should be split between the United States marshal and the custodian, if at all. See Cali-
fornia Dep't of Correction v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1425, 1426 (1984) (Rehnquist J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Compare Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1286
(3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion) (responsibility for transportation must rest on state),
cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985) and Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (responsibility may rest on state), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425
(1984) and McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (absent show-
ing of unreasonable burden, responsibility must rest on state) with Ford v. Allen, 728
F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (responsibilty may rest on United States
marshal) and Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 1978) (same) with Story v.
Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1181 (3d Cir. 1982) (state and United States marshal may split
responsibility) and Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (same).
21. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1286 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion),
cert. granted sub nom Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. United States Marshals
Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
22. See, e.g., id; Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1977); McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp.
1202, 1203 (,V.D. Ark. 1984).
23. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
24. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807) (opinion by Marshall, CJ.);
see Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1906); Holmes v. Goldsmith, 147 U.S. 150, 158
(1893); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
25. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion)
(without statutory authority, such an order would constitute a "raid. . .on the United
States Treasury"), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United
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A. Statutes Dealing with the Powers of the Marshal
Several sections of the Judiciary Act delineate the powers of the
United States marshal. z6 One such section provides that the marshal of
each district "may, in the discretion of the respective courts, be required
to attend any session of court."27 Some courts have held this to be au-
thority for the federal judiciary to order the Marshals Service to trans-
port state prisoners." Although it "quite clearly authorizes the district
court to require the attendance of the marshal at any judicial proceeding,
including any proceeding at which the testimony of a state prisoner may
be required,"29 the plain meaning of the statute necessitates the conclu-
sion that it concerns only courthouse security.30 Indeed, protection of
the judiciary is one of the primary functions of the Marshals Service.3'
States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985); see, e.g., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369,
1370 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (district court had statutory authority to impose full
costs on Marshals Service); Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1982) (no
authority to compensate for compliance); McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1203-04
(W.D. Ark. 1984) (finding no statutory authority); Ball v. Woods, 402 F. Supp. 803, 810
(N.D. Ala. 1975) (paying for attendance of prisoner is "beyond any statutory authority"),
modified mem., 541 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Wiggins v. County of Alameda,
717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (no congressional authority to order reim-
bursement, but district court has discretion to allocate costs "in any number of combina-
tions"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984).
"The general 'rule is that a court may not authorize the commitment of federal funds
to underwrite the necessary expenditures of an indigent litigant's civil action.'" Moss v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.R.D. 624, 625 (E.D. Va. 1979) (quoting Haymes v.
Smith, 73 F.R.D. 572, 574 (W.D.N.Y. 1976)). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982)
allows courts to appoint counsel for indigents, it makes no provision for payment of fees.
Courts have been unwilling to order the federal government to compensate attorneys
appointed to represent indigents in civil actions. See Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1078-
80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 487
(S.D. Tex. 1972), affid, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). But see Allison v.
Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271, 275 (N.D. Cal. 1967) ("Appointment of counsel to an indigent
incarcerated plaintiff in a civil action implicitly authorizes the commitment of federal
funds to underwrite necessary expenditures."), rev'd on other grounds, 434 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
26. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 561-575 (West 1968 & Supp. 1984).
27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 569(a) (West 1968 & Supp. 1984).
28. See, eg., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (1lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Bal-
lard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977).
29. Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1982).
30. In interpreting statutes, one should look first to the statute's plain meaning.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statu-
tory Construction § 45.01, at I (C. Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984).
28 U.S.C. § 569(a) (1982) may provide authority for a court, in the interest of court-
house security, to direct the Marshals Service to take prisoner-witnesses into custody at a
point outside the courthouse. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir.
1984) (plurality opinion) (presumption that there is no federal court security interest until
prisoner is delivered to courthouse may be overcome if prisoner is particularly dangerous
or if his own safety is at risk), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction
v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985). But see McGee v. Rankin, 584
F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (prisoner must be delivered to courthouse for
federal interest to arise).
31. "Since 1789 the United States has depended upon its own marshals for the secur-
ity of its own court facilities, and few if any federal judges would be comfortable with any
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Other sections of the Judiciary Act allow the United States marshal
the expense of transporting prisoners,32 and provide that the marshal
"shall execute all lawful writs, process and orders ...of the United
States."33 These sections, however, enumerate obligations of the United
States marshal,34 who must obey the mandates of the federal courts 35 and
other arrangement." Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1287 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality
opinion), cert. granted sub norm. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985); see In re Neagle, 39 F. 833, 861 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1889) (duty of United States marshals to protect federal judges), aftid, 135 U.S. 1 (1890);
28 C.F.R. § 0.111(d) (1984) (Director of United States Marshals Service responsible for
courtroom security).
32. "Under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, each United States mar-
shal shall be allowed-. . . the expense of transporting prisoners, including the cost of
necessary guards and the travel and subsistence expense of prisoners and guards .... 1
28 U.S.C. § 567(2) (1982); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(j) (1984) (Marshals Service may
transport prisoners under "cooperative or intergovernmental agreements"). Courts have
found sufficient authority in these provisions to order the transportation of state prison-
ers. See, e.g., Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Ballard
v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 569(b) (1982). Courts have relied on this section to impose the burden
of transporting state prisoners on the Marshals Service. See Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d
1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir.
1977).
34. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion),
cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985); Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1982);
McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1203-04 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
Although 28 U.S.C. § 567(2) (1982), which allows for the expense of transporting pris-
oners, demonstrates that Congress envisioned the use of marshals for the transportation
of prisoners, the statute is silent as to state prisoners. Even if Congress did intend to
include state inmates, the statute requires that such transportation be made under the
supervision of the Attorney General, not the federal judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. § 567(2)
(1982); see also Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (3d Cir. 1982) (even if statute
did encompass state prisoners, it does not authorize marshal to relieve state custodians of
their obligations).
28 U.S.C. § 569(b) (1982), which requires marshals to execute all lawful writs, merely
provides for "executive branch enforcement of federal judicial process." Story v. Robin-
son, 689 F.2d 1176, 1179 (3d Cir. 1982); see McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1203
(W.D. Ark. 1984). Only when the custodian fails to respond to the writ does an obliga-
tion on the part of the United States marshal arise. See Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176,
1179 (3d Cir. 1982).
35. See Levy Court v. Ringgold, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 451, 454 (1831) (United States mar-
shals are "mere ministerial officers, to execute process when put into their hands, and
[are] not made the judges whether such process shall be issued."); United States ex reL
Brown v. Malcolm, 350 F. Supp. 496, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (when writ came into mar-
shal's hands, it became his mandatory duty to execute it); 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 496, 498
(1840) (same).
In Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1978), the court issued a writ directing the
production of a state prisoner to both the United States marshal and the state custodian.
See id. at 405. When the marshal served the writ on the custodian, the marshal informed
the custodian that the Marshals Service would not transport the prisoner. Id. at 405-06.
Thereafter, the state custodian produced the prisoner. See id. at 406. The court noted
that "[t]he fact that a controversy may have existed as to who should actually transport
and suffer the expense of producing the prisoner had no effect upon the existing writ and




is empowered to transport prisoners if the court so orders.36 The court's
authority to issue an order such as a writ of mandamus, however, must
itself derive from some other statutory source.37
B. The All Writs Act
The All Writs Act (Act)38 authorizes the federal courts to issue "all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." '39 The Act does not confer
federal jurisdiction," but it does grant broad powers once jurisdiction
has been established in some other manner.4' Because federal civil rights
actions fall within federal jurisdiction,42 courts may, pursuant to the Act,
issue orders to nonparties to the original action,43 including United
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
39. Id.
40. Baker Perkins, Inc. v. Werner & Pfleiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1983); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976); Mead v.
Parker, 464 F.2d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1972); CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F.
Supp. 644, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1972); see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 515 (1954)
(Minton, J., dissenting); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 279 (1948); Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1942); Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 136-
37 (1906); Bath County v. Amy, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 244, 249 (1871); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 616 (1838); M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506
(1813); United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 F.2d 804,
808-09 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958).
41. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942) ("federal
court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties. . . to
achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it"); Hamilton v. Naka, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("once jurisdiction has attached, powers under § 1651(a) should be broadly
construed"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972); see, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
299 (1969) (although Congress has not established fact-finding procedures for habeas
corpus actions, courts may use the Act to "fashion appropriate modes of procedure" to
accomplish discovery); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284 (1948) (court may "issue an
order in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus commanding that a prisoner be brought to
the courtroom to argue his own appeal"); American Lithographic Co. v. Werckmeister,
221 U.S. 603, 608-09 (1911) (Act encompasses power to issue subpoena duces tecum);
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126, 127 (Ist Cir. 1941) (court may
issue subpoenas under the Act); Franklin v. Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1333 (D. Or.
1983) ("It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act. . .for a district court to
issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases. . . ."), ajfd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nom. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984);
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967)
(federal courts have statutory "authority to enter such orders as may be necessary to
enforce and effectuate their lawful orders and judgments, and to prevent them from being
thwarted and interfered with by force, guile, or otherwise").
Courts issue orders under the Act at their discretion. See United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 177 (1977); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284-86 (1948); Ad-
ams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), (4) (1982).
43. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 177-78 (1977); Application
of United States, 610 F.2d 1148, 1155 (3d Cir. 1979). See infra note 44.
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States marshals,' if the burdens imposed by such orders are reasonable45
44. United States marshals must obey the mandates of the federal courts. See supra
note 35.
One court has held that the Act does not grant power to federal courts to order the
Marshals Service to transport state prisoners. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283,
1286 (3d Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion), cert granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of
Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. CL 1166 (1985). The Opinion An-
nouncing the Judgment of the Court followed a syllogism: Because writs of habeas
corpus ad testificandum may be issued only to the custodian of the prisoner, any order to
the United States Marshals Service to produce state prisoners must be a writ in the nature
of a mandamus; under two hoary Supreme Court decisions, McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) and M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), federal
courts are not empowered to issue writs of mandamus to officers of the executive branch;
therefore, because United States marshals are members of the executive branch, federal
courts may not compel them to produce prisoners. See Garland, 737 F.2d at 1286.
Although it has been said that the marshal "acts concurrently as an officer of the fed-
eral judiciary and as an executive officer," United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 649 (3d
Cir. 1960), the President appoints the marshal for each judicial district, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 561(a) (1982), and the Attorney General supervises the Marshals Service, Garland, 737
F.2d at 1291 (Becker, J., concurring); 28 U.S.C. § 569(c) (1982). Thus, United States
marshals "belong emphatically to the executive department of the government." In re
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890); see Martin v. Tobin, 451 F.2d 1335, 1336 (9th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (United States marshal is a purely executive officer who may be removed
from office by the President at any time); Farley v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 757, 758
(CL Cl.) (same), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956).
The Third Circuit's reliance on McClung and MYntire, however, is misplaced.
Both cases involve the same plaintiff attempting to secure title to certain land in Ohio.
See McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 599 (1821); M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 504, 505 (1813). The question certified for review in M'Intire was whether the
circuit court had the "power to issue a writ of mandamus to the [federal] register of a
land-office in Ohio, commanding him to issue a final certificate of purchase to the plaintiff
for certain lands in that state." Id. at 504-05 (emphasis in original). The Court held that
§ 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the predecessor of the current All Writs Act) conferred
power only when it was "necessary" to the exercise of a court's jurisdiction. See id. at
505-06. Because the issue, possession of land, was essentially local and could be deter-
mined without issuance of the writ, it was not "necessary" to the court's jurisdiction for
the writ to be issued. See id Moreover, the Court stated, § 14 did not grant federal
jurisdiction; thus, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the case at all. See id M'Intire
therefore does not apply to the issue at hand, because federal courts have jurisdiction over
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), (4) (1982).
After his setback in M'Intire, the plaintiff returned to Ohio and pursued two new
courses of action: Again seeking a writ of mandamus, he sued in state court, see Mc-
Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 599 (1821), and in federal court, this time
claiming federal diversity jurisdiction, see id at 599-600. The state court found that it
had jurisdiction, see id at 599, but on the merits refused to issue the writ of mandamus,
see i d at 599, 602. The Supreme Court affirmed the state court, but on jurisdictional
grounds, holding that a state court may not issue a writ of mandamus against a federal
executive officer, because of "the supremacy of the United States." Id at 605.
Regarding the petitioner's claim of diversity jurisdiction, the Court interpreted
M'Intire as holding simply that federal courts do not have the power to issue writs of
mandamus to executive officers in original actions for mandamus. See id at 600-02.
Thus, in M'Intire the Court read the Act as not granting jurisdiction, and in McClung
refused to find the jurisdiction to issue the writ, even though the Court already had fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction. "Why there would be no jurisdiction in such a case is a mys-
tery that perhaps only those deeply schooled in the mindset of that era could solve."
Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1290 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., concurring)
(resisting the temptation to interpret the case against the historic reluctance of the early
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and the issuance of the writ is "necessary or appropriate" to the court's
Court to act against "a hostile executive"), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of
Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985). Apparently the court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because it did not have the power to grant writs
of mandamus against executive officers in original actions for mandamus. Although the
court had diversity jurisdiction, the action was nevertheless in the nature of an original
mandamus action against an executive officer insofar as mandamus was the only remedy
the plaintiff sought. See McClung, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 605.
M'Intire and probably McClung have since been legislatively overruled, see Perez v.
Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65, 69 n.8 (E.D. La. 1965), by the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982), which provides that "[t]he district court shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff." Id. The writ will be issued only when the plaintiff has a clear right to relief,
the defendant has a plainly defined duty to do the act in question, and no other remedy is
available. See Schulke v. United States, 544 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1976). The Mandamus
and Venue Act was intended to correct a historical aberration whereby only federal
courts in the Distict of Columbia could grant mandamus relief in an original action. See
Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatu-
tory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308, 310-13
(1967). Federal courts have always had the power to mandamus executive officers when
the writ's issuance is ancillary to some other jurisdiction, see Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120
U.S. 450, 453 (1887); Bath County v. Amy, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 244, 249 (1871); Kendall
v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 616-18 (1838), as long as the writ
was to compel a ministerial and not a discretionary act, id. at 616-18; see Wilbur v.
United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1930); United States ex rel Riverside
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316, 324 (1903); United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guth-
rie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 303-04 (1854). United States marshals, when acting as officers
of the court, perform ministerial functions. Levy Court v. Ringgold, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 451,
454 (1831); United States v. Persinger, 562 F. Supp. 557, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1982); see 3 Op.
Att'y Gen. 496, 498 (1840). A court order to a United States marshal to produce a state
prisoner in a § 1983 action is ancillary to pre-existing jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(a)(3), (4) (1982).
45. In United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered a public utility to
assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation to install pen registers on telephones for sur-
veillance purposes, even though the telephone company was not a party to the action.
See id. at 177-78. The Court noted that such an order would not be burdensome because
it provided that the telephone company be "fully reimbursed at prevailing rates." See id.
at 175. New York TeL establishes that the All Writs Act empowers federal courts to
impose reasonable burdens on nonparties. See id. at 172-74; United States v. McHie, 196
F. 586, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1912); see, e.g., Application of United States, 610 F.2d 1148, 1155
(3d Cir. 1979) (not an unreasonable burden to order telephone companies to trace calls
when companies are to be compensated); Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565
F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977) (same); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809,
813-14 (7th Cir. 1976) (telephone company must make available its aid and know-how);
cf Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967)
(Act "applies whether or not the person charged with the violation of the judgment or
decree was originally a party defendant to the action"), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Os-
bourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S. 579 (1968).
In his dissent in New York Tel., Justice Stevens argued that the holding was too broad
and that its only precedent was the common law writ of assistance, which "authorized
the indiscriminate search and seizure of undescribed persons or property based on mere
suspicion." New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 180 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). "The use
of that writ by the judges appointed by King George III was one British practice that the
Revolution was specifically intended to terminate." Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
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jurisdiction.46 One court has interpreted this reasonableness standard as
entitling the state-a nonparty to the proceedings- to reimbursement by
the Marshals Service for the costs incurred by the state custodian in
transporting a prisoner.' The court reasoned that imposing any expense
on the custodian was unreasonable, but failed to justify alleviating the
burdens of one nonparty by placing them on another.4" In addition,
although the state is not technically a party to the litigation,49 it has an
interest in the outcome of the action. 0 If the plaintiff prevails, the state
part). Justice Stevens' main concern was that the telephone company's assistance in se-
curing the pen registers would not aid the court's jurisdiction. See id. Similarly, the
United States marshal is not a party in cases involving the transportation of state prison-
ers; the marshal is, however, statutorily obligated to obey the federal judiciary. See 28
U.S.C. § 569(b) (1982). See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). Recent Supreme Court interpretations of what is
"necessary or appropriate" to the jurisdiction of federal courts have been liberal. See
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 173 (1977) (Court has applied Act
flexibly to "'achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it' ") (quoting Adams v. United
States ex reL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299
(1969) (courts may rely on act to "assist them in conducting factual inquiries"); Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948) (Act is not "an ossification of the practice and proce-
dure of more than a century and a half ago"); Adams v. United States ex reL McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942) (Act is a procedural instrument "for achieving the rational ends
of law").
47. See Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1978).
48. See id. The court reasoned that the state's interest was minimal because its "only
real relationship to the federal proceeding is the fact that it has custody over the particu-
lar plaintiff." Id at 408. Although the warden has an obligation to respond to the writ,
"to additionally require that this be done at the state's own expense would present an
unreasonable burden." Id Therefore, the court ordered that the state be reimbursed.
See id; see also Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (although state has
real interest in outcome of action, it does not so outweigh that of federal government in
preserving civil rights that state should "be required to bear complete responsibility for
the prisoners' transportation"). The court ignored that once the decision is made to
transfer the prisoner, the cost will be placed on a nonparty, either the state or federal
government, and the current statutory mechanism places the burden on the state custo-
dian. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
49. The Civil Rights Act states that "[e]very person. . . shall be liable." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) (emphasis added). The eleventh amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States." U.S. Coast. amend. XI.
Thus, federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear suits against a state unless the state
consents. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Georgia R.R. & Banking
Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 & n.13 (1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890). Local
government units, which are not considered to be part of the state for eleventh amend-
ment purposes, may be sued. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 & n.54 (1978). A municipality cannot be held liable on a theory of respon-
deat superior, however. Id at 691; see McCowen v. City of Evanston, 534 F. Supp. 243,
246 (N.D. IIl. 1982). Rather, a local government employee must have acted under an
official policy. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Smith v. City of Oklahoma City, 696 F.2d
784, 786 (10th Cir. 1983); Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1982).
50. See McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (because custo-
dian is substantially involved with the litigation, it will be excused from its obligation
only if it demonstrates an "extremely unreasonable burden"). But see Ford v. Carballo,
577 F.2d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 1978) ("interest of the state is minimal").
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may be forced to expend its funds to improve conditions at its correc-
tional facility51 or to indemnify its employees.5 2 Moreover, the defend-
ants are alleged to have acted "under color of" state law. 3
The argument against unduly burdening a nonparty is better advanced
by the Marshals Service. Its interest is less than that of the state because
it is essentially indifferent to the outcome of the action,54 and its burden
is greater because it has fewer resources available in each state for the
long distance transfer of prisoners." More importantly, however, even if
the burdens sought to be imposed on the Marshals Service were reason-
able, the Act grants mandamus power only when "necessary or appropri-
ate" to the court's jurisdiction56 and required to reach "rational ends of
law."57 The Supreme Court has stated that what is "necessary or appro-
priate" to a court's jurisdiction may be determined by looking to com-
mon law analogies.5 8 Thus, for example, because there is no statutory
51. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 419 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1977). Although the
eleventh amendment prohibits private parties from seeking to impose a liability to be paid
from the state treasury, see supra note 49, prospective relief is permissible, see Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 & n.22 (1977) (decree mandating creation of vocational
schools permissible); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (prospective relief
permissible even though it may have impact on state treasury); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In the face of
constitutional violations at a state institution, a federal court can order the state either to
take the steps necessary to rectify the violations or to close the institution. Thus, a state
cannot avoid the obligation of correcting the constitutional violations of its institutions
simply by pleading fiscal inability."); Municipal Auth. v. Pennsylvania, 496 F. Supp. 686,
689 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (eleventh amendment only prohibits retrospective relief directing
the state to pay money from its treasury). The eleventh amendment, therefore, "does not
immunize the state prison from judicial supervision," even though the prospective relief
may be costly. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 419 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1977); see Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (prison authority required to provide inmates with law
library). See supra note 4.
52. See C. Bartollas, supra note 4, at 273.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
54. "[T]he Marshals Service. . .is only related to the litigation by its federal status."
McGee v. Rankin, 584 F. Supp. 1202, 1205 (W.D. Ark. 1984). But see Ballard v.
Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) ("rights invoked are federal in nature"). In
addition, the federal interest may be limited because custody itself is not at issue. Seybold
v. Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
55. The President appoints one United States marshal for each judicial district. See
28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1982). There are presently over 90 judicial districts. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 133 (1982). Approximately 1600 Deputy United States marshals are scattered through-
out these districts. The District of Columbia District, with 120, employs the most deputy
marshals. Telephone interview with William Dempsey, Public Information Officer,
United States Marshals Service (Mar. 8, 1985).
In contrast, state prisons employ a large number of correctional officers. In 1981, for
example, Illinois employed 3667 correctional officers; California, 3603; Texas, 3044;
Maryland, 1552; Alabama, 1040; Connecticut, 920; North Dakota, 94. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1982,
Table 1.65, at 136-37 (1983).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982).
57. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942).
58. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221 n.35 (1952); see also United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 187 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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authority for a writ of habeas corpus ordering the custodian to produce a
prisoner to prosecute his claim pro se, a federal court may, pursuant to
the Act, issue a writ of mandamus.5 9 The writ should be directed to the
state custodian because at common law the only means of securing a
prisoner's presence was to issue a writ of habeas corpus,t" to which it was
the custodian's duty to respond.6"
Similarly, when a state prisoner's in-court testimony is required, the
writ of mandamus to the Marshals Service is not "necessary or appropri-
ate" to the court's jurisdiction because there is another method for secur-
ing the prisoner's presence: the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.62
It does not become "necessary or appropriate" to the court's jurisdiction
to impose costs on the Marshals Service simply because the state claims
that it lacks funds to transport a prisoner.63 "The fact that a party may
be better able to effectuate its rights or duties if a writ is issued never has
been. . . a sufficient basis for issuance of the writ."' Mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy to be used when no other option exists.6 5
Although section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act66 creates rights that are
59. In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), the Supreme Court held that a federal
court could, pursuant to the Act, order a federal prisoner to be produced in court to
argue his habeas corpus appeal. In determining whether such an order would be "neces-
sary" to a court's jurisdiction, the court compared it to the common law writs of habeas
corpus. See id. at 281-84.
60. See supra note 8.
61. See supra note 10.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1982). See supra note 8.
63. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 189 (1977) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting in part). The writ should be issued to aid the court's duties and jurisdiction, not
to reduce burdens placed on others. See id.; see also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299
(1969) (courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure to aid their habeas corpus
jurisdiction); cf, eg., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604 (1966) (injunction under
Act used to "prevent impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction"); ITT
Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978) ("conduct not
shown to be detrimental to the court's jurisdiction ... could not have been enjoined
under the Act"); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352,
1355-56 (10th Cir. 1972) (order restraining sheriff's sale reversed because order did not
aid court's jurisdiction).
Therefore, an interpretation of the Act as a grant of authority to transfer to the United
States Treasury the cost of complying with writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum is
without support. "Any other interpretation of section 1651 would permit district courts
to impose the expenses of litigation upon the Treasury of the United States whenever that
seemed to the court to be a good idea." Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (3d
Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion), cerL granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction
v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
65. "[I]f a court is able to effect a full and complete resolution of the issues before it
without resorting to the extraordinary measures contemplated under the Act, then such
measures cannot be employed." ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351,
1359 (5th Cir. 1978); see Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (per
curiam) ("mandamus is. . .to be invoked only in extraordinary situations"); of Exparte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947) ("Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges
are drastic and extraordinary remedies.").
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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federal in nature,67 the claim flows from the state-imposed incarceration
or other action.68 The state must therefore bear ultimate responsibility
for the transportation costs of indigent prisoners unless Congress decides
that federal aid is appropriate. 69 Courts are without power to order fed-
eral aid because that determination is one which Article I of the Consti-
tution expressly leaves to Congress.7"
II. A PROPOSED COMPROMISE
One court,7' recognizing the budgetary constraints that have arisen in
many states and the federal government,'7  has ordered the state to de-
liver the inmate to the state or county prison facility closest to the United
67. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), is important to "our constitutional
scheme." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); see Ballard v. Spradley, 557
F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977) (rights invoked are federal in nature); Aldisert Report,
supra note 4, at 11 ("A significant number of conditions-of-confinement complaints raise
constitutional questions of great importance.").
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
69. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., concur-
ring) (recommending that Congress consider the issue), cert. granted sub nom. Penn-
sylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
See supra notes 17, 25, 64 and accompanying text, and cases cited supra note 5.
In Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 282 (1983), the
district court had dismissed an indigent's action for failure to prosecute because the indi-
gent could not pay his witness fees. See id. at 288. As the court of appeals noted, "[i]t is
paradoxical to provide an indigent plaintiff with the right to proceed in court, then deny
him a meaningful chance to exercise that right by not providing him assistance in paying
routine costs in so exercising that right." Id. at 291. The court nevertheless upheld the
dismissal because there was no statutory basis on which to award a payment of witness
fees. See id. But see United States ex rel. Helwig v. Cavell, 171 F. Supp. 417, 423-24
(W.D. Pa. 1959) (allowing payment of witness fees), affid sub nom. United States ex rel.
Helwig v. Maroney, 271 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 954 (1960).
As a matter of comity, it may be argued that "[t]o charge the states for actions brought
in the federal courts, as well as for actions brought in the state courts, would be inequita-
ble. Each sovereign should assume responsibility for the conduct of in forma pauperis
litigation within its own court system." United States ex rel Griffin v. McMann, 310 F.
Supp. 72, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (doubtful proposition that federal government can grant rights to citi-
zens by statute and then impose costs on state as a constitutional matter).
70. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. One court has noted that there is
no authority for the proposition. . . that the question of who should pay for a
state prisoner's presence is to be determined by reference to the varying inter-
ests of the parties that may be held responsible for these costs. Instead, the
proper inquiry is whether Congress. . . ever authorized reimbursement for the
costs of compliance with a writ.
Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1425 (1984). Indeed, the balancing of these burdens is a task more appropriate for Con-
gress than for the courts. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Becker, J., concurring), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v.
United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
71. Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977).
72. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., con-
curring) (discussing vexing financial problems of state and federal governments, and "fi-
nancial realities"), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United
States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
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States courthouse requiring the prisoner's presence."n The federal mar-
shal was then responsible for delivering the prisoner to court and later
returning him to the same facility.7 4
Although under present law courts are without power to issue such
orders, this splitting of costs and responsibility is fair to both parties.
The state is not unduly burdened when it transfers a prisoner from one
state facility to another; such transfers occur regularly."' Nor is a great
burden imposed on the United States marshal, as it is unlikely that he
will have to travel out of the municipality in which he is stationed.76
Transfer of custody will take place at a prison, not at a courthouse or
some other neutral location, thereby minimizing security risks.7 More-
over, if costs are divided, courts will be less likely to consider financial
burdens when deciding whether to order the production of a prisoner.78
The result would be to enhance courts' fact-finding abilities.7 9
The ideal resolution would be for the states and the Marshals Service
to reach an agreement among themselves.8" The Marshals Service is al-
ready empowered to enter into intergovernmental agreements for trans-
porting prisoners.8" In the absence of an agreement, congressional action
73. See Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977); Aldisert Report, supra
note 4, at 16 n.29.
74. See Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977). This was the custom
in at least one district. See Story v. Robinson, 689 F.2d 1176, 1178 (3d Cir. 1982).
75. See Moeck v. Zajackowski, 385 F. Supp. 463, 465 (W.D. Wis. 1974) ("there are
frequent occasions for travel outside the prison by inmates of the prison for such purposes
as medical treatment, attendance at funerals of close relatives, and appearances in state
courts for various reasons"), rev'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976); see,
&g., United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 344 & n.3 (1978) (prisoner transferred be-
tween facilities); Carmona v. Warden of Ossining Correctional Facility, 549 F. Supp. 621,
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same). In addition, state officials may transfer prisoners between
correctional facilities as a means of punishing them. See Millemann & Millemann, The
Prisoner's Right to Stay Where He Is: State and Federal Transfer Compacts Run Afoul of
Constitutional Due Process, 3 Cap. U.L. Rev. 223, 225-27 (1974); Note, No Process Due
Prisoners in Intrastate Transfers. Due Process Imprisoned Within the Entitlement Doc-
trine, 38 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 561, 567-71 (1977).
76. The federal courts are located in major cities, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1982),
where there are likely to be local jails and holding facilities.
77. Risk of escape and harm to the public is one of the factors courts consider when
deciding whether to order the production of prisoners. See supra note 17.
78. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., con-
curring), cert. granted sub norm. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Mar-
shals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985). Many jurisdictions consider financial burdens in
determining whether to order the production of prisoners. See supra note 17.
79. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., con-
curring) (to deny such orders because of costs may hinder "the ability of the federal
courts to find facts accurately" and so "impair the vindication of civil rights"), cert.
granted sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv.,
105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
80. See Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (decrying the inability of state and federal governments to reach a fair resolution
of the matter), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984).





Federal courts may require the presence of state prisoners at civil
rights trials. Under present law, the state must bear the cost and respon-
sibility of producing a prisoner in court. This unfairly burdens the states
because the prisoner is pursuing a federally based claim. The states and
the United States Marshals Service should agree to share expenses. Fail-
ing that, Congress should grant courts the flexibility to apportion costs to
the Marshals Service. Such flexibility would enhance the fact-finding
abilities of the federal courts and thereby further the vindication of state
prisoners' civil rights.
Mark K. Dietrich
82. See Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that Congress consider this issue), cert. granted sub nom. Pennsylvania
Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985). Any con-
gressional action should give courts sufficient flexibility in mediating the financial
problems of the sovereigns. Cf id. (Becker, J., concurring) (flexibility and creativity in
mediating financial problems of state and federal governments should be encouraged);
Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1976) (courts should develop "imaginative
and innovative methods of dealing with the flood of prisoner complaints and suits").
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